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CONTROL OF A LABOR UNION - BY WHOM,
OVER WHAT?
SIDNEY E. COHN AND DAVID LUBELL*
There is much confusion, even among the well-informed, about
the meaning of the word "control" when used in the trade union sense.
And there is reason for the confusion. The very word-control-
carries with it conflicting connotations. It means good or evil, depend-
ing upon who does the controlling and for what purpose. It means
to regulate; it means to dominate; it means to curb; it means to guide.
In order to understand the problems of control as the word is
used in trade union terminology, it is necessary to examine the basic
structure of the trade union movement. The popular concept is that
the AFL-CIO "controls" the destinies of the organizations chartered
by it and is responsible for their deeds and misdeeds.
The history of the AFL and the CIO proves the contrary. Prior
to the adoption of the Code of Ethical Practices by the AFL-CIO, it
was the pro forma answer of the AFL or the CIO that it did not and
could not control the internal affairs of any international that was
chartered by it, and even after the passage of the Code of Ethical
Practices, the AFL-CIO has not attempted to control the activities of
its chartered affiliates but reserves the right to withdraw the charter
from such affiliate upon conviction of a violation of the Code of
Ethical Practices, a right very sparingly used.
The law generally recognizes the local union as the creature of
the international.' With the creation comes the implied agreement by
the local and its members to operate under and be governed by the
provisions of the international constitutions. The international union
attempts to exercise a direct control over the affairs of its locals, and
the constitution of most international unions usually contains a whole
series of provisions by which this control is theoretically safeguarded.
The basic "boiler plate" provisions usually found in these international
constitutions are:
1. The right to change the jurisdiction of the local union 2
2. The right to control funds, property and collective bargaining
rights of the local unions.
3. Provisions that in the event of the dissolution, secession or revoca-
* Members of the New York Bar.
1 Alexion v. Hollingsworth, 289 N.Y. 91, 43 N.E.2d 825 (1942).
2 See, e.g., art. XV, § 2 of the Constitution of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and art. VII, § 6 of the Constitution of the Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
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tion of a charter, all of the properties of the local shall revert to
the international.3
4. Prohibition against dissolution or secession as long as seven mem-
bers remain in good standing and desire to retain the charter.
(Some locals have as many as 30,000 members.)4
5. Prohibition against the dissolution of the international union as
long as three local unions are willing to remain affiliated with
the international.'
6. Right to discipline the local union and its officials.0
7. Right to establish trusteeships over local unions. 7
The built-in constitutional provisions for control give rise to the
basic questions, "Who controls the international union?" and "Are
there any counter controls which local unions effectively exercise over
the international?" To answer these questions intelligently it is neces-
sary to examine the widespread notion that an international union is
actually controlled either by a dictator or, at best, by an oligarchy
subservient to dictators.
Free association of the words "Teamsters Union" during the
Roosevelt era meant "Dan Tobin's Teamsters." During the early days
of the Eisenhower administration, Teamsters and Dave Beck were
synonyms. As an aftermath of the McClellan Committee hearings,
Jimmy Hoffa is the new synonym for the Teamsters Union. The tend-
ency on the part of the public to merge the individual and a union
into one is not confined to the Teamsters. Garment workers means
David Dubinsky, longshoremen means Harry Bridges, New York Hotel
Trades Council means Jay Rubin, auto workers means Walter Reuther,
and the AFL-CIO means George Meany. These men and their coun-
terparts are pictured as labor union bosses beyond control, who must
hereafter be controlled, and the paths of control lie through legisla-
tion and the courts.
Undeniably strong labor leaders wield enormous influence in
3 See, e.g., art. XIV, § 8 of the Constitution of the Bakery and Confectionary
Workers International Union of America, and art. X, § 28 of the Hotel and Restaurant
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO.
4 See, e.g., art. XIV, § 22 of the Constitution of the Bakers International, and art.
VII, § 7 of the Constitution of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
5 See, e.g., art. I, § 4 of the Constitution of the International Hotel and Restaurant
Workers.
6 See, e.g., art. IX of the Constitution of the United Steelworkers of America, CIO,
and art. IV, § 8 of the Constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers.
7 See, e.g., art. XX, §§ 4(a) and 4(d) of the Bakers International Constitution.
For a more detailed examination of these powers, see Cohn, "The International and the
Local Union," 11 N.Y.U. Annual Conference on Labor 7 (1959).
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their international, but control of the international has always been
subject to counter control by the courts and by an evergrowing sys-
tem of administrative regulations, both federal and state.
A. CONTROL BY THE COURTS-GENERAL
One important source of restriction upon unbridled exercise of
power by the international is the brake provided by the common law.
The early view of the state common law was strictly legal-to hold
that the international constitution and bylaws were a contract be-
tween the union and its members which controlled the terms upon
which membership and accruing rights in the union could be obtained
or lost. The New York Court of Appeals aptly described and adopted
this view in Polin v. Kaplan:8
The Constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated association
express the terms of a contract which define the privileges secured
and the duties assumed by those who have become members. As the
contract may prescribe the precise terms upon which a member-
ship may be gained, so may it conclusively define the conditions
which entail its loss.
This approach, while primarily strengthening the hand of the
international, also provided protection to the local and the member
against actions by the international not in accordance with or con-
trary to the constitution and bylaws.9 This standard finds partial
recognition in recent federal labor legislation.'0
With the increasing perfection of new and overreaching methods
of control by the international in accordance with (and actually fur-
thered by) the union constitution," the common law courts increasingly
intervened on broad equity grounds to impose restraints upon inter-
national actions contrary to justice. Again the New York court pro-
vides an excellent statement of this attitude. In Irwin v. Possehl,12
the court stated:
The constitution and laws of every labor organization are to bejudged and construed in this state and country according to well-
conceived ideals and principles of law, ordained by a democratic
people proud of their heritage and zealous of the protection of
8 257 N.Y. 277, 281, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
9 Poln v. Kaplan, supra note 8; Fanara v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 205 Misc. 538,
128 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Canfield v. Moreschi, 182 Misc. 195, 49 N.Y.S.2d 903
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
10 See § 302 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 462
(Supp. I, 1959).
11 See, e.g., Feller v. Egelhofer, 125 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Steinmiller v.
McKeon, 21 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 899, 26 N.Y.S.2d 491
(1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 508, 41 N.E.2d 925 (1942).
12 143 Misc. 855, 858, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 601 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
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their rights of equal opportunity, of voice in the selection of local
and general officials, in taxation, the appropriation and expendi-
ture of money for governmental purpose, and of the right and op-
portunity of assembly and freedom of speech.
This "equity" concept of court restraints upon the international's
action has found ever widening acceptance and use, particularly in
the legal battles against bureaucracy."3
In Crawford v. Newman,'4 the New York court recently reaf-
firmed the broad equity position, stating:
It is unconscionable to hold that, because a written contract does
not expressly so provide, that a contracting party may not, with-
out breaching the contract, disaffiliate from a corrupt and dishonest
association. This is especially so when there is at stake the welfare
of thousands of members of a union, together with the public
confidence so essential to maintain peaceful and friendly relations
with businessmen, big and small.
The doctrine has been invoked by the courts to prevent the literal
use of constitutional provisions by the international for the purpose
of oppressing the local and its members."
B. CONTROLS BY THE LOCAL UNION AND LocAL MEMBERSHIP
1. Modes of Control
Absent the effective controls embodied in the written constitution
and bylaws, the core of control exercised by the local is through the
means of its day-to-day relationship with the workers and the em-
ployer. This is the backbone of trade union power.
The worker in the shop will usually have contact only with
the local leaders and will give his allegiance to that leadership and
the local. These leaders are home-grown, having arisen from the local
shop in most instances. The international may be a stranger or even
an imposing outsider to the member.
For the most part, the employer deals with the local and its lead-
ership in day-to-day operations and negotiations. The very preference
of the employer to deal with the local leadership, as persons he knows
13 Illustrative of the use of this equity concept are the New York sandhog cases:
Dusing v. Nuzzo, 262 App. Div. 781, 26 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1941); 177 Misc. 35, 29
N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941), modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941);
178 Misc. 965, 37 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 989, 40 N.Y.S.2d
334 (1943), modified, 182 Misc. 264, 291 N.Y. 81, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).
14 13 Misc. 2d 198, 202, 175 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, mem., 8
'App. Div. 2d 789, 188 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1959).
15 Garcia v. Ernst, 101 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1950); O'Neill v. United Plumbers,
348 Pa. 531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); Liming v. Maloney, 32 Tenn. App. 632, 225 S.W.2d 276
(1949).
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and has been dealing with, becomes significant in an international-
local dispute where the employer, asserting his contractual rights, will
support the local union.
The right of certification as collective bargaining representative
under the National Labor Relations Act 6 is most often vested in the
local union. The extent to which this statutory right supersedes the
typical provision of the union constitution that the international is
entitled to the collective bargaining rights has been the subject of
apparently conflicting adjudication.' 7
A final means of control exercised by the local is the power of
secession. This move, by which the local membership disaffiliates
en masse from the international and re-establishes itself as an inde-
pendent local or affiliates with another international, has become a
frequent weapon by dissident locals against bureaucratic inter-
nationals. The weapon's major obstacle is the continued validity of
the "seven-member" rule, incorporated either in the constitution and
bylaws or the state common law. Some courts avoid the seven-mem-
ber bar to disaffiliation by ruling that the facts are insufficient to show
seven remaining members. 8 A lower court's attempt to rule that the
doctrine was against public policy and invalid met with stern rebuke
by the appellate court. 9 In general, the present view of this court ap-
parently would tend to restrict the effectiveness of the seven-member
principle by holding it effective to retain the local's designation but
not effective to prevent the vast majority of the local's members, who
have disaffiliated, from taking with them the assets of the local and
the pension and welfare funds20
2. Areas of Control
The three main areas over which the local attempts to exercise
control and power are: the pension and welfare rights, the assets and
funds of the local, and collective bargaining rights. Only the first two
of these areas are discussed here.
16 Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1958) states: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purpose shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining..."
17 Compare, NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., 179 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1950) with
Carpinterina Lemon Ass'n v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1956).
18 Crawford v. Newman, supra note 14.
10 Bradley v. O'Hare, 19 Misc. 2d 612, 188 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1959), rev'd,
11 App. Div. 2d 15, 202 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1960).
20 Ibid.
1961]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
a. Pension and Welfare Funds
The pension and welfare funds present a difficult and involved
area. These funds are playing an increasingly important role in our
society and economy. They are a source of security to workers in
combatting fears of a poverty haunted future. They provide a sizeable
source of consumer purchasing power to employees receiving benefits.
They are a source by which the union and its members are knitted
together. And, perhaps most significantly they provide an awesome
source of power in the hands of those controlling the funds through
the very size of the funds,21 and the opportunity of abuse of a char-
acter not unfamiliar to those following the expos6s of governmental
and business corruption.
The threshold issiie raises the all-important question, "Who owns
the funds"? The interested parties include contributing employers,
the union members, the local and the international. The federal law-
the Federal Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,22-- provides
no clue to the answer of this question. In fact, that act, in essence,
only sets forth certain reporting requirements resulting in little more
than increased paper work.3
Several recent New York cases have thrown light upon the issue
of pension and welfare funds and the rights to such funds.
In Whelan v. O'Rourke,24 the court was concerned with whether
the pension funds follow the workers. In that case, the Teamsters
International evaluated and reorganized the jurisdiction of its Local
282 by transferring approximately one thousand of the members of
that local to Local 807. Local 282 had a pension plan and fund under
which contributions had been theretofore made on behalf of the
thousand transferred workers. Local 807 fund officials offered to grant
the transferred workers all rights under the Local 807 plan (which
was identical to the Local 282 plan in all material respects) and all
accumulated credits if Local 282 would transfer the funds. The fund
officials of Local 282 refused to transfer the funds. The matter was
sent to an arbitrator who ruled in favor of transfer of funds. Despite
provisions that his decision was "final and binding and shall be
adopted," Local 282 refused to comply and a declaratory judgment
21 In the single year of 1954, $6,846,200,000 was put into welfare and pension
funds. Final Report of Sub-Committee on Welfare and Pension Funds, S. Rep. No.
1734, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1956).
22 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. I, 1959).
23 The policy of the act stated in § 2(b), 72 Stat. 997 (1958), 29 U.S.C.
§ 301(b) (Supp. I, 1959) is solely to require disclosure to participants of the plans of
"financial and other information" in regard to such plans.
24 5 App. Div. 2d 156, 170 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1958).
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was sought. The lower court granted the declaratory judgment on
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. This decision was affirmed
on appeal. The appellate court recognized "that the trust agreement
does not precisely contemplate the situation here under review" but
it found "an arsenal of authority sufficient to comprehend the decision
of the arbitrator which constituted 'the vote of the trustees.' 7,25
The court rejected the argument of Local 282's union trustees
that they would be willing to administer the funds that had been
collected for the thousand transferred members and make distribution
as the members qualified for the benefits. The court's rejection is
based upon its disability to substitute its judgment as to the course to
be taken for the judgment of the arbitrator which constituted the
judgment of the trustees.26 In addition, under the federal law the
pension fund must be jointly administered by "representatives of the
employees. 27 The transfer of the thousand members from Local 282
to Local 807 terminated the status of Local 282 officers as "repre-
sentatives of the employees." Local 282 no longer had bargaining
rights with the employees of the thousand transferred men. Therefore,
it would appear on the merits that the federal law precludes accept-
ance of Local 282's contention.
The decision goes as far as to indicate that at least where the
majority of trustees agree, the pension funds belong to the worker
and therefore will follow him. Whether the same result would follow
if the majority of trustees had voted against transferring the welfare
funds to the workers' new local is an open question.
Nicoletti v. Essenfield28 concerns welfare funds, rather than pen-
sion monies, of a teamster local. Approximately one-third of Local
202's membership was transferred to newly created Local 277 in
September, 1954. But the employers continued to contribute to Local
202's fund on behalf of these employees until March, 1955. At that
time a new agreement became operative and the employers com-
menced contributions to the new Local 277 welfare fund, administered
by Local 277 representatives and the employers. Negotiations com-
menced to have the proportion of the $660,000 of welfare monies
then in the Local 202 fund, attributable to the transferred employees,
conveyed to Local 277. In the midst of negotiations, an action was
commenced to restrain Local 202 trustees from transferring the said
proportion of the fund. The court, in effect, ruled that the welfare
25 Id. at 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
26 Ibid.
27 Labor-Management Relations Act § 302(c)(5)(b), 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(b) (1958).
28 11 Misc. 2d 197, 171 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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funds belonged to the beneficiary employee, and held that Local 277
was entitled to the welfare funds collected for the transferred workers.
The court stated:
Plainly, however, where a reserve is accumulated in a welfare
fund, the protection and advantages provided by that reserve should,
in the absence of countervailing considerations, be enjoyed by the
employees on whose behalf the reserve was accumulated ....
This does not mean that an employee could lawfully demand that
his pro rata portion of the reserve be paid directly to him; for his
interest therein is only the equitable interest of a cestui que trust.
Nor does it mean that there may not be circumstances under
which an employee may lose even that equitable interest.
29
Regardless of who is determined to control the pension and wel-
fare funds, the common law has clearly declared that the controlling
officers of the fund are fiduciaries impressed with a common law trus-
tees' duties to the fund. Thus, in upholding the right to an accounting,
the court has stated that union "fiscal officers have a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the members" of the unionY0
In Upholsterers Int'l Union v. Leathercrajt Furniture Co.,31 the
Pennsylvania Federal District Court stated the general scope of the
fiduciary standard that the court will apply to the welfare fund:
Whenever the trustees use, or attempt to use, directly or indirectly,
the fund for purpose other than for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employee-members, this Court, when called upon, will enjoin
the trustees from making the improper expenditure. The burden-
ing of the fund with undue administrative expenses or lush salaries
for union officials will not be tolerated; excessive restrictions, either
in the insurance policies or the by-laws and regulations, or the
providing of small benefits to the employee-members in proportion
to the amount contributed by the employee parties or the premiums
paid, taking into consideration the risks involved, will cause more
than a lifting of the eyebrows. A provision in the by-laws or regula-
tions denying the employee-members the right to resort to the Courts
to protect their beneficial interests in the fund is of no legal effect.
The fiduciary concept has been applied to union welfare and
pension funds in varied manners, including appointment of a new
trustee of any insurance fund by the international union,2 treatment
of the welfare and retirement fund as a charitable beneficiary trust,
33
bequest to a railroad employees' pension fund being upheld as char-
29 Id. at 200, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
30 Dusing v. Nuzzo, supra note 13, at 38, 29 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
31 82 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
32 Suffridge v. O'Grady, 84 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
33 Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (DJ).C. 1948).
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itable,34 sustaining an action against trustees for wrongfully with-
holding pensions,39 and forbidding commingling of pension and welfare
funds with general funds or use of such funds to make an unsecured
loan to a corporation managed by union officers and owned by union
members as beneficiaries.3 6
The battle in the Bakers Union is an example of pension and
welfare fund issues arising in the context of secession. The pension
fund of the Bakers is operated at a national level by the International
Bakers and Confectionery Workers Union.3 Continued membership
in good standing in the international is a prerequisite for eligibility in
the pension plan. After the international was ousted from the AFL-
CIO when it refused to oust its president, James Cross, approximately
fifty thousand members of the New York local of the international
seceded and joined a newly created rival international union. The
question remains what disposition is to be made of the pension funds
attributable to these disaffiliated employees held by the international.
The dilemma to the employees is clear. If they disaffiliate they stand
in jeopardy of losing their pension rights and fund; if they remain in
the international, they are parties to the continuance of the exposed
corruption of the international. Any resolution of the issue must con-
sider all the variants, including the situation where the international
is democratic and "clean" and the local is racket-ridden.
b. Property and Assets of the Local
An indication of the trend of thinking of the courts is indicated
in Crawford v. Newman,35 involving the property and assets of the
disaffiliated New York Bakers local. On broad grounds of public
policy and equity, the court held that there was a valid disaffiliation
from the international and that the assets and property belonged to
the local. The court stated:
A violation of the trust so reposed in labor leaders is in and of
itself sufficient justification for a local union to call it quits. This
is precisely what motivated the two local unions to disaffiliate from
the International, and the record amply justifies their action. Had
the locals disaffiliated for caprice or from internecine dispute it
would have been another story.39
34 In re Tarrant's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 42, 237 P.2d 505 (1951).
35 Fornish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 105 AtI. 67 (1954).
36 Vaccaro v. Gentile, 138 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
37 The fund covered 305,000 employees through forty-eight states and thousands of
contributing employers.
38 Supra note 14.
39 Id. at 202, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
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Significantly, the decision avoids a storming of the citadel of the seven
member doctrine. The court expressly held the evidence insufficient
to show that seven members desired to remain in the old local. One
may wonder whether the same decision would have resulted if the
evidence showed seven, or some other negligible number of members
who desired to remain in the local.
In the recent case of Bradley v. O'Hare,40 the court was con-
cerned with the legitimate purpose for which a local may effectively
disaffiliate from its international taking its assets with it. The local,
which had disaffiliated from the International Longshoremen's Union
(ILA), while successful in the court below upon other grounds, argued
in the appellate court that continuation of the ILA in the AFL-CIO
was an implied condition of the local's affiliation with the international,
and upon the breach of this condition there came into being "frustra-
tion of purpose" giving the local a legitimate legal basis for terminating
the affiliation and taking its assets. The appellate division reversed,
holding that the reason advanced was not sufficient and that in order
to retain its assets, the disaffiliating local would have to show cor-
ruption in the ILA, even though the funds were collected from local
members for local purposes.
The court rejected the argument of the lower court that the
seven-member rule was contrary to public policy. After pointing out
that at least nineteen of the twenty-seven internationals on the AFL-
CIO Executive Council had such minimum member provisions, the
court stated:
An international and its constituent locals are nothing less than a
system of private representative government for the performance
of a very delicate and important function in the economy (see
Isaacson, The Local Union and the International, 3 N.Y.U. Conf.
on Labor, 493,494). They exist for the benefit of the worker
members. If the international is to perform its function adequately,
the right of the local to secede may be qualified even though the
parochial interests of its own members might be served, momen-
tarily, by disaffiliation.41
In spite of the continued validity given to the seven-member rule, the
court would hold the provision no bar to a disaffiliation based on valid
grounds with retention of the funds and assets in the disaffiliating local
collected from and for the benefit of the local's members.
Apropos of the issues involved in the Bakers' national pension
fund, is the statement of the court indicating the importance of the
level at which the funds are collected:
40 Supra note 19.
41 202 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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Assuming that the beneficial owners of union assets are the worker
members and that the international has lost its trade-union char-
acter, one must still decide whether the beneficial interest is in the
membership of the international or only in the membership of the
local union. The answer will be contingent upon what assets are
involved, their source, and the purpose for which they are com-
mitted. Also relevant may be such factors as the past relationship
between the local and the international with respect to financial
matters and the extent to which the local has functioned as an
autonomous unit.4 2
In Crocker v. Weil,43 action was brought by a trustee of a dis-
affiliated local union of the International Bakery and Confectionery
Workers to obtain the funds of the local. In rendering a decision in
the hearing on the merits,44 the court upheld the trusteeship and
awarded the trustee the assets of the local, holding: (a) the inter-
national constitution was a binding contract between the international
and the local. Thus imposition of the trusteeship was justified since it
was provided for in the constitution where there is disaffiliation. (b)
The funds of the local, except the death benefit fund (which the court
found the international had previously treated as a completely local
matter), belong to the international since under their charters and
the constitution, the locals are not substantially independent. (c) Con-
tinued affiliation in the AFL-CIO by the international was not an
implied condition of the constitution or contract between the parties.
(d) Maintaining corrupt officials in office by the international was
not a breach of the constitution and did not free the local from the
obligations of its contract. (e) The trusteeship, having been imposed
in accordance with the constitution, was not a violation of title III
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. (f) The
defense of unclean hands was not applicable since the alleged in-
equitable conduct had nothing to do with the dispute before the court.
Irrespective of the merit or lack of merit of the above cases, the
divergent reasoning and approach indicates the continued conflict and
parallel existence of the strict legal approach of Crocker v. Weil and
the broad, equitable, public policy approach of Bradley v. O'Hare.
The common law restrictions upon the local union are two-pronged.
The first is from the cases, above discussed, where the courts have en-
forced the strict legal approach and upheld the rights granted the
international by the union constitutions. The second prong is provided
by the growing willingness of courts to intervene on behalf of the
42 202 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
43 45 L.R.RM. 2074 (Ore. Cir. 1959).
44 45 L.R.RX.M 2934 (Ore. Cir. 1960).
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abused or oppressed individual member against the overreaching
bureaucratic local.
C. RANK AND FILE MOVEMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP
One of the most important (and least considered) forces restrict-
ing the abuse of power by both the international and local, and guar-
anteeing a democratic trade union is the rank and file movement of
the membership. For example, wherever one turns in the labor
history of anti-racketeering in New York, rank and file movements
will be found in the forefront.
The break-up of the "stranglehold" of racketeers Dutch Schultz,
Jules Martin and Paul Coulcher on the restaurant industry was ignited
by rank and file leaders. The testimony of local officials was in large
measure responsible for the successful criminal prosecution of the
racketeers. 45 It is a striking example of courageous rank and file
members dealing with racketeers and racketeering.
Likewise, the New York motion picture operators themselves
took the meaningful steps in wresting control from the racketeers,
when the members of Local 306 ousted Sam Kaplan as union president
for corruption and denial of democratic rights.46 The New Jersey
building trades broke the control of Theodore M. Brandle by ousting
his slate at the annual State Building Trades Council convention.
Most dynamic in illustrating the potency of the interaction of
rank and file movements with judicial remedies is the struggle of the
New York area sandhogs against corrupt international officers. The
New York City sandhogs were organized into Local 147 in 1938,
bringing to an end a long period of factional disputes. The local at
that time was an example of democracy evidenced by rank and file
control. The racketeering in this instance came from the international
officers. During this period great construction projects were proceed-
ing in New York City, including the building of the Queens Midtown
Tunnel. The temptations for the rewards arising from graft and
corruption were great.
In April, 1939, the international president ordered the suspension
of the elected officers of Local 147; the local was to be taken over by
his associate Bove, all funds were to be turned over to Bove and further
membership meetings were prohibited. When the rank and file re-
fused to obey these directives, the international president suspended
the local and directed Bove to take over its affairs and funds. He
notified the banks where the local had accounts that no checks were
45 People v. Coulcher, 255 App. Div. 954, 8 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1938).
46 N.Y. World-Telegram, May 21, 1934; See Polin v. Kaplan, supra note 8.
47 N.Y. Times, May 22, 1934.
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to be honored except by Bove's signature. Refusing to capitulate to
the international, the rank and file went to court and obtained an
injunction against the international's action that had been taken with-
out charges, without a hearing, and without a trial.
The international was not yet defeated. It attempted next to
shift the work in New York City from Local 147 to two other locals
which it controlled. At the international convention in St. Louis,
the international president presented his charges and the convention
rubber stamped them by authorizing him to press his charges before
a trial board composed of the members of the international executive
board. The rank and file continued to fight for a fair hearing. But
their demands for particulars were denied. As was to be expected, the
local and its leadership was found guilty on all counts.
Again the rank and file turned to courts to thwart the attempt by
the international to control the local. The civil equitable remedy
granted to the local and its leadership was its trump card. In Moore
v. Moreschi,48 the local decisively beat the international's attempt
to control it and a permanent injunction was granted. The local and
the rank and file had broken the attempt to oust its democratic leader-
ship from control of Local 147.
The situation upstate with Local 17 in Newburgh was somewhat
different. Again, the international wanted to control a local for its
own ends. In their efforts, they had the active support of one Nuzzo,
secretary-treasurer and business agent of Local 17. For a long period
of time the members of the local had protested to the international
regarding Nuzzo's behavior, ranging from accusations that he ac-
cepted bribes from contractors to irresponsibility and incompetence.
In October and November, 1937, the international, in a decision
to thwart the growing protest, ordered that no more meetings of the
local be held and that nothing be done without the approval of Bove.
Nuzzo was kept in his position and continued to collect money from
the members. Further, no member of the local could get work without
first obtaining a card from Nuzzo. Now in the hands of the corrupt
racketeers, Local 17 was pillaged and robbed. Nuzzo collected between
$200,000 and $600,000 in funds. Yet there was only $107.93 in
the local treasury. The rank and file once again utilized the potent
power of the equity court. They obtained an order for an election and
accounting of funds.4 9 At the court-ordered election, the rank and file
scored a resounding victory. Nuzzo and his slate were defeated. But
on the pretense of complaints from Nuzzo, Moreschi deputized his
48 179 Misc. 475, 39 N.Y.S.2d 20S (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 265 App. Div. 989, 40
N.Y.S.2d 334 (1943), modified, 291 N.Y. 81, 182 Misc. 264, 44 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1943).
49 Dusing v. Nuzzo, supra note 13.
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followers to take over the local for the purposes of "investigation"' and
to preside at meetings. Further, he deprived the local of job juris-
diction. The active rank and file again fought and in Canfield v.
Moreschi,0 the court granted an injunction prohibiting the inter-
national from interfering with the leadership and operation of Local 17
by its own elected officers. As a fitting climax to the civil actions Nuzzo
was indicted and convicted of grand larceny, petit larceny, and
forgery."
The campaigns against the racketeers in the labor movement con-
tinues with vigor-both at the international and local 2 levels. The
vigor of these activities from within the labor movement and the force-
ful assistance of criminal law prosecutions and common law remedies
provide a decisive control over the abuse of power.
D. CONTROL BY THE AFL-CIO
The AFL-CIO is a new force in the interaction of the interna-
tional the local and the membership. This is of relatively recent
vintage and a shift of emphasis from the traditional view of the labor
federations as loose federations of autonomous national and inter-
national unions.
The basic means of control exercised by the AFL-CIO is the
power to expel the international or national union from the Federa-
tion for good cause. This power has resulted from the adoption of
a Code of Ethical Practices by the Federation. To complement the
power exerted by the expulsion is the Federation's recognized power
to establish a new rival international with parallel jurisdiction with
the expelled international and to win the employees away from the
expelled international into the new union. This was generally the
mode of control used in the expulsions by the Federation in the late
1940's, and in the recent expulsions for corruption. Alternatively, the
Federation has been able to use the overlapping jurisdiction of existing
national unions against the expelled international.
Of less drastic nature is the Federation's use of the threat of
suspension or expulsion to correct an unsatisfactory situation within
50 180 Misc. 153, 40 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1943) and 182 Misc. 195, 49 N.Y.S.2d
903 (Sup. Ct. 1943), modified, 268 App. Div. 64, 48 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1944), aff'd 294
N.Y. 632, 64 N.E.2d 177 (1945).
51 People v. Nuzzo, 267 App. Div. 785, 46 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1943), rev'd on other
grounds, 294 N.Y. 227, 62 N.E.2d 47 (1945).
52 At the local level, the campaign against the racketeers has also been vigorous.
Various locals of the Retail Clerks International Union have revolted against corrupt
local leadership, including Local 1648 in New York, whose leadership was sent to jail
for extortion and the expulsion of the leaders of several Retail Clerks Locals for
exploiting union members from minority groups, Newsweek Magazine, April 29, 1957.
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the union. Empirically, this power of control has not appeared to be
effective. The result has been that in most instances the Federation
has reverted to the expulsion of the international.
Fundamentally, this control by the AFL-CIO rests upon the
extent of public appeal and prestige that affiliation with the Federa-
tion carries and the disgrace in the eyes of union members of expulsion
of the international from the AFL-CIO. Expulsion from the Federa-
tion is not of itself such a frustration of the relationship between the
international and the local as legally to justify secession by the local. 3
In most instances such expulsion has been a significant factor in the
decline and demise of the international. But the most striking example
is the failure of the AFL-CIO's power of expulsion in the Teamsters
International situation. The Teamsters Union today remains a huge
and powerful force, without any loss of membership, and with working
arrangements with many segments of the labor movement within the
AFL-CIO.
E. CONTROL BY FEDERAL AGENCIES
So far the examination has been confined to controls exercised
by intraunion forces as confined and defined by the common law. In
addition there is the significant control exercised by federal agencies
under federal statutes and the control exercised by the states and
their agencies under state laws. A sketch of these powers indicates
their scope and relevance.
1. Control by the National Labor Relations Board under the
National Labor Relations Act
Besides the basic functions of the National Labor Relations Board
[hereafter, Board] under the federal act to regulate and control the
collective bargaining relationship between the union and the employer,
the Board regulates and exercises power over areas within the domain
of the relationship between the international, the local and the mem-
bers. These areas include:
(a) Determination of who "owns" the collective bargaining con-
tract where there is a conflict or split between the local and the inter-
national. The Board has most often held that the contract "belongs"
to the local and not the international. 4
(b) Supervision of representation elections. 5 Through such su-
pervision, the Board exercises the potential power to exclude employer-
dominated or racketeer-controlled paper locals, to give the employees
a meaningful, democratic choice between rival unions as to which
53 Bradley v. O'Hare, supra note 19; Crocker v. Wel, supra note 43.
54 Supra note 17.
55 National Labor Relations Act, § 10, #49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958).
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union will represent them in securing and holding the collective
bargaining rights, and to present a fair opportunity for an insurgent
union to wrestle control away from a racketeer-led local. Obviously,
this control is, at most, one intended to give the employees a fairly
chosen collective bargaining representative. It cannot be a force to
defeat racketeers. In fact, the too active and too broad use of the
power of supervision of representation elections can frustrate the
purposes of the labor act, cause unconscionable delay in the certifica-
tion of a union, and actually permit an unrepresentative and disruptive
minority to delay and thwart the employees in selecting their collective
bargaining representative.
(c) Prior to the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Board
exercised some degree of control through the section 9 filing require-
ments. 6 A detailed examination of this control exercised by the Board
is outside the scope of this article. It is sufficient to note that alongside
of its primary purposes of securing free collective bargaining between
the employer and the union, as the representative of the employees,
and protecting the process of representation elections, the Board's
intrusion into the intraunion situation inevitably leads to yet another
control of the union and another source of power conflict.
2. Control by the Secretary of Labor
The Landrum-Griffin Act57 places the Secretary of Labor actively
in the business of control over the intraunion relations between the
international, the local and the membership. The position of the
Secretary of Labor in the scheme of the act is central to both investiga-
tion and enforcement under the act.
Despite the broad powers granted to the Secretary of Labor
under the Landrum-Griffin Act, and the long and onerous burdens
placed upon trade unions by the provisions of the act, the Secretary's
report for the nine month period from the effective date of the law,
September 14, 1959, to the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1960,
strikingly reveals that little, if anything, has been done to correct the
purported abuses in union election procedures for which the act was
supposed to be a panacea. In fact, when placed in juxtaposition with
court litigation, the report shows that the act is an invitation to mis-
chievous, dilatory and disruptive machinations by disgruntled individ-
56 Section 201(d) and (e) of the act, 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-59
(Supp. I, 1959), repeals §§ 9(f), (g) and (h) of the NLRA as amended, 61 Stat. 152
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-59 (1958), and in effect transfers the area encompassed by the
repealed subsections to the Secretary of Labor.
57 Officially known as the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 530 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 461 (Supp. I, 1959).
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uals within a labor organization, and has little true relationship to the
guaranteeing of free elections and the uprooting of a corrupt lead-
ership.
The report notes the filing with the Secretary of Labor of 369
alleged violations of section 401 during the nine month period. Of
these, 338 were filed by union members. 195 were against local unions
and 139 against union officers.5" But the report also states that:
The majority of the complaints were prematurely filed, in that the
internal administrative proceedings of the union had not been fol-
lowed by the complainants as required by the Act. It is the policy
of the Act to avoid premature involvement in election matters.
Experience gained thus far indicates that most of the complaints
filed with the BLMR area offices prior to an election are not refiled
after the election. The Bureau has received numerous requests to
furnish observers at the polls during election; however, the Act
gives to the Bureau no such authority, and therefore such requests
have been denied. 9
There is no reported instance, either in the report or any of the
law reports, of an action being commenced by the Secretary of Labor
for violation of section 401.
The case litigation under title IV further accentuates the failure
of the title's provisions to remedy election abuses and its inclination
to compound proceedings and invite splinter harassment. The union
member has no direct remedy in court against an executed union
election, for it has been held that under the act he must first exhaust
internal remedies and apply to the Secretary of Labor.60 There ap-
pears no case"' where the complainant was successful on the merits.
The impact has been not to clean up abuses, since there has been a
startling lack of success, but rather to harass the union's operation,
cast suspicion upon the elected leadership, compel expenditure of union
funds in litigation, and generally hamper the operation of the trade
union.
A clear illustration of this impact is a recent case in New York
involving Local 807 of the Teamsters. In that case,62 the plaintiffs,
opposition candidates for office in the election for local leadership,
58 Report of the Bureau of Labor Management Reports, Fiscal Year 1960 (Sept.
14, 1960), tables 9 and 10.
59 Id. at 61-62.
60 Myers v. Operating Engineers, 45 L.R.R.M. 3045 (D.C. Mich. 1960); Byrd v.
Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
61 The Teamster monitorship situation discussed infra, p. 192 where an executed local
election was at last held up, is a unique exception, occurring prior to the effective date
of the act.
62 West v. Truck Drivers Local 807, C-4701 (SD. N.Y. 1960).
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brought an action under section 401(c) of the act, claiming that the
defendant local had violated the act by: (1) the local's publishing and
distributing a special election issue of "The 807 Teamster," which
had a model ballot spread on pages 2 and 3, with the paper's usual
masthead on the upper-lefthand corner of page 2, including the names
of the officers of the union, the individual defendants; (2) placing the
organization ticket, on which the defendants were candidates, on row
A of the ballot and the plaintiffs' slate on row B of the ballot; and
(3) holding the election at one polling place.
Significantly, Local 807, one of the largest Teamster Locals in
the country, has a nation-wide reputation for honest and democratic
trade unionism. Local 807's President, John Strong, and its Secretary-
Treasurer, Thomas Hickey, are well-known leaders for democracy
within the Teamsters International.63 Thus, rather than being a
weapon against the undemocratic union, the act was here being used
by dissident elements to harass one of the outstanding examples of
honest local trade unionism within the Teamsters International.
The suit was brought by the plaintiffs on November 29, 1960, to
restrain an election to be held on December 4, 1960.64 The first objec-
tion voiced by the plaintiffs was received by the defendants on No-
vember 28, 1960. The suit therefore had all the attributes of an
eleventh-hour attempt to stop a pending election. The district court
denied plaintiffs' application in full,65 and the election proceeded as
scheduled.
While the decision of the district court is clearly correct, the
very institution of the proceeding and the invocation of the act reveals
the mischief that can be caused by the act. The arguments raised by
the plaintiffs obviously lacked merit. Yet, they were made the basis
of a federal action under the federal statute. If the district
court judge had not ruled off the bench, the potential disruptive
impact of the act would have become a reality. Election delay, un-
warranted expense of money by the local, and an unsettled situation
would have resulted.
Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Secretary of Labor is given
broad authority to conduct investigations and to take action against
violence, threats of violence, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds
and those practices which may be lumped together as racketeering
63 See Newsday Magazine, December 16, 1958.
64 Section 401(c), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 481 (Supp. I. 1959) provides
for injunctive relief on petition of the individual members and does not interpose the
Secretary of Labor prior to commencing court action.
65 McMann, J., ruled off the bench, without a written opinion.
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practices, particularly as these crimes may occur in the complex area
of relationship between the international, the local and its members.
Yet it is most significant that the first report exhibits most clearly the
failure to deal with any of the purported abuses in internal affairs, let
alone to check any of the alleged abuses. The act has cured none of the
ills for which it was the nostrum, but it has clearly created additional
procedural problems and provided new tactical weapons for those
intent upon harassing unions and causing disruption.
F. CONTROL THROUGH EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
Racketeering is a question of crime, whether the racketeer is
a union official, an employer, or one who preys on either unions,
employers or both. Since labor racketeering is a question of crime,
the most direct and effective method of eradicating it is through
vigorous and conscientious enforcement of the state penal law and
the federal criminal code. Where other means are used the result is
inevitably, unintentional or otherwise, to restrict legitimate activities
of the trade union. Further, the use of other means to deal with
racketeering other than treating it as a crime, is to impose outside
controls upon labor unions, the relationship of the international, local
and member, and to place outside groups in the business of controlling
and even "running" the labor union. The logical culmination is the
court appointed, directed and imposed monitorship over the Teamsters
International which, as will be shown infra, has solved no problem of
racketeering and has exercised or attempted to exercise no control
over every aspect of the intra union-member relationship.
An examination of effective criminal law enforcement reveals
its potency in dealing with racketeering at its own level and defeating
such racketeering. The New York experience is illustrative both be-
cause of the extent of experience in this area and the existence of
vigorous law enforcement. Beginning as far back as the turn of the
century66 and continuing to the present, labor and industrial racketeers
in New York State have been sent to jail by district attorneys in-
voking the arsenal of statutes contained in the New York Penal Law."
The principal weapons contained in the law are the provisions against
06 See People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29 (1893); People v. Barondess, 133 N.Y. 649
(1892), reversing 61 Hun. 571, 16 N.Y. Supp. 436 (App. Div. 1891). The illustrious Sam
Parks of the Building Trades was convicted of blackmail in 1903. Baker and Stannard,
"The Trust's New Tool-The Labor Boss," McClure's Magazine November, 1903.
197 People v. Chester, 4 Misc. 2d 949, 158 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Gen. Sess., 1957); People
v. Cilento, 2 N.Y.2d 55, 156 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956). Johnny Dio was convicted of
extortion and conspiracy in 1958, receiving a 15-30 year sentence. N.Y. Times, January
9, 1958, p. 1.
1961]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
bribery,6 8 extortion,69 larceny,7  kickback71 conspiracy,72 and inter-
ference with the right of a person to exercise a legal right,73 as well
as the obvious provisions against assault, manslaughter and murder.7 4
The counterpart of these statutes is contained in the criminal law of
practically every state.
In addition to the tremendous range of weapons contained in
state penal laws, there are federal statutes, such as the Hobbs Anti-
Racketeering Act 75 the penal sections of the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act,76 prosecution for violation of federal tax laws, 77 federal
conspiracy laws and provisions forbidding use of the mails to de-
fraud78 etc.
In recognizing the positive and crucial power exercised by effective
criminal law enforcement in controlling racketeering and yet permitting
"free-play" in the bona fide relationship between international, local,
68 N.Y. Penal Law, § 380. See People v. Chester, supra note 67; People v. Cilento,
supra note 67; People v. Bock, 69 Misc. 543, 125 N.Y. Supp. 301 (Erie County Ct.,
1910), af'd, 148 App. Div. 899, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1141 (1911).
69 N.Y. Penal Law §§ 850-52, 857. People v. Coulcher, 255 App. Div. 954, 8
N.Y.S.2d 162 (1938); People v. Brindell, 194 App. Div. 776, 185 N.Y. Supp. 533 (1921);
People v. Weinsemer, 117 App. Div. 603, 102 N.Y. Supp. 579 (1917); People v. Hughes,
supra note 66.
70 N.Y. Penal Law § 1290. People v. Nuzzo, supra note 51; People v. Sealisi, 288
N.Y. 220, 42 N.E.2d 494 (1942); People v. Herbert, 162 Misc. 817, 295 N.Y. Supp. 351
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
71 N.Y. Penal Law § 962. People v. Fay, 182 Misc. 358, 43 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
72 N.Y. Penal Law § 580(1) (5) (6). People v. Coulcher, supra note 69; People v.
Kaplan, 143 Misc. 91, 251 N.Y. Supp. 874 (Gen. Sess. 1932), 240 App. Div. 72, 264 N.Y.
Supp. 542 (1934), aff'd, 264 N.Y. 675, 191 N.E. 621 (1934).
73 N.Y. Penal Law § 530. People v. Kaplan, supra note 72.
74 People v. Bucholter, 289 N.Y. 181, 45 N.E.2d 225 (1942).
75 60 Stat. 420 (1946), 18 U.S.C. § 195 (1958). The act has been used to cover a
variety of corrupt activities. See, e.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956); United States v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956) ; United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.
1955); Dale v. United States, 223 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1955); Bianchi v. United States,
219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955); Hulahan v. United
States, 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954); Nick v. United
States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 687 (1941).
76 Labor-Management Relations Act § 302, 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186
(1958). United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956); Brennan v. United States, 240
F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1957).
77 See United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933) cert. denied, 289
U.S. 759 (1933).
78 On December 5, 1960, James Hoffa was indicted for mail fraud arising from
the Sun Valley transaction which had been used to such a great extent by the Board
of Monitors to impede the leadership of the Teamsters Union.
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and member, the pivotal consideration is that labor racketeering is
criminal activity, to be treated and prosecuted as such. The state
penal code sets forth what constitutes criminal behavior and acts.
Wherever you find a corrupt labor official, you will find criminal acts
and behavior which a state's penal code will encompass.
Labor racketeering is not a unique thing. It is part of general
corruption and racketeering. As far back as the turn of the century
the famous New York prosecutor, William Travers Jerome, stated:
This corruption in the labor unions is simply a reflection of what we
find in public life. Everyone who has studied our public life is
appalled by the corruption that confronts him on every side ...
and this corruption in public life is a mere reflection of the sordid-
ness of private life .... 79
The New York and federal experience shows that whenever there
has been a conscientious and serious effort to prosecute labor racket-
eering, the state and federal penal laws have provided potent and sure
weapons. These criminal laws have not been found wanting. Racket-
eering has only been allowed to flourish when these laws were placed
in hibernation. Once activated and utilized the rackets have been
broken, the gangsters prosecuted, and the rank and file of the labor
union freed from oppression and a policy of free collective bargaining
has returned as the dominant feature of federal and state labor policy.
G. CONTROL BY THE INTERNATIONAL UNION-TRUSTEESHIPS
1. Control by and Over the Union's Trusteeship
A union trusteeship may be imposed for many varied reasons.
It may serve varied purposes. Its impact in any single instance may
be great or small. Its objective result to the employees in the shop
may be positive or negative. It is the very propensity of the union
trusteeship to serve as a tool, and often an extremely effective one,
for good or evil, that makes any predetermined standard, other than
case by case examination, difficult and dangerous.
2. The Case Law Prior to the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959
The evolving case law, based upon general principles of common
law and equity, has established certain essential road-posts by which
the court will determine the validity of a trusteeship imposed upon a
local union. These essential prerequisites can be succinctly stated:
first, the imposition of the trusteeship must have support by provisions
in the union constitution, and the procedure set forth in the union
constitution for establishing such trusteeship must be followed.
79 As quoted in article by Baker and Stannard, supra note 66.
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In House v. Schwartz,"° the New York Supreme Court, in striking
down the appointment of a trustee over a local, expressed in general
a wary attitude towards trusteeships. Moreover, in Hickman v.
Kline,8 the Nevada Supreme Court, upon petition by the local, in-
validated a trusteeship imposed upon Local 159 by the Painters
International Brotherhood, holding that the right of the local to
enjoy self-government was not taken from it in accordance either
with the provisions of its constitution or with traditional concepts
of due process.
In Spitzer v. Ernst,12 an international was enjoined from taking
over the property and control of a local joint executive board, even
though the board was expressly created by the international union
and despite a clear provision in the constitution purporting to give
to the general president power to take over control of a local joint
executive board whenever the president decided it was in the best
interest of the international union.
A second prerequisite to a validly imposed trusteeship is that the
provisions and procedures of the union constitution meet the general
standard of due process. In Washington Local 104 v. Int'l Bhd. of
Boilermakers,83 the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the in-
junction and broadened the relief given the local union against inter-
ference by the parent union and its officers. In a broad statement
applying the standard of due process to the rights of the local and
its members, the court states:
.. it is within the powers of the courts, and indeed it is their duty,
to protect the property rights of the members of such organizations,
when they are threatened and endangered, without specific charges
and opportunity to be heard.84
In Reiser v. Kralstein,5 it was held that a provision of the union
constitution providing for imposition of a trusteeship without hearing
where there was an emergency, was not applicable in view of the
failure-of the international to show a bona fide emergency. And in
Neal v. Hutcheson8 8 an action was brought against the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters to enjoin the summary suspension of the
Greater New York district and the locals therein. In granting the
80 18 Misc. 2d 21, 188 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
81 71 Nev. 55, 279 P.2d 662 (1955). Accord, O'Brien v. Matual, 14 INI. App. 2d 173,
149 N.E.2d 446 (1957).
82 190 Misc. 47, 72 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
83 33 Wash. 2d, 1, 203 P.2d 1019 (1949).
84 Id. at 74, 203 P.2d at 1061.
85 26 L.R.R.M. 2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950).
86 160 N.Y. Supp. 1007 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
[Vol. 2Z
CONTROL OF A LABOR UNION
injunction the court specifically held that the procedure and appeals
contemplated in the union constitution did not constitute due process
of law.
In Bricklayers Union v. Bowen,87 the court enjoined the defend-
ants from taking over Local 39 stating:
In other words, the law insures to every member of such an as-
sociation a fair trial, not only in accordance with the constitution
.. . but also with the demands of fair play, which in the final
analysis is the spirit of the law of the land.88
A third prerequisite for a validly imposed union trusteeship is
that the trusteeship must be for a legitimate purpose. Where the
trusteeship has been imposed to stifle democratic opposition to the
international leadership or policy the courts have struck down the
trusteeship. 9
In Local 373 v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers," the court
granted the local a permanent injunction against interference by the
international. In looking behind the asserted grounds for the trustee-
ship, the court stated:
The excuse put forward by the International was that its action was
necessary in order to preserve the local from destruction by internal
dissensions. The only internal dissension existing so far as disclosed
or even intimated by the affidavits or the proofs, was a dissension
as to who was the legally elected business agent of the local. Under
the constitution, that was an agent which the members of the local
had the right to choose; it was purely a matter for the local, and
could have been decided by the local, and in fact it had been decided
by the local....
In Local 118 v. Utility Workers Union,9 an Ohio court of
appeals vacated the suspension of the local officers of Local 118 and
the imposition of the trusteeship, which had been based upon charges
that the local officers had violated the national union's constitution
by refusing to honor a picket line established around the employer's
plant by the joint council with the approval of the national union. The
court found that the picket line was established in violation of the
no-strike clause of the collective bargaining contract between the local
and the employer and therefore violated the public policy of Ohio.
The equitable powers of the court has heretofore been utilized to
scrutinize the validity of a trusteeship from the vantage point of its
87 183 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
88 Id. at 859.
89 Schrank v. Brown, 192 Misc. 80, 80 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
90 120 N.J. Eq. 220, 184 AtI. 531 (1936).
01 162 N.E.2d 524 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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real purpose-thus both protecting the local and its members and the
rights of the international.
Finally, courts have been able to surmount the major procedural
obstacles to correct abuses of union trusteeships by utilizing their
equitable powers. The major procedural obstacle raised is the failure
of the local union or the members thereof to exhaust their internal
union remedies prior to commencing judicial action. In most instances
the courts have met and rejected this defense on one of several bases:
1. No exhaustion of internal union remedies is required where
the remedy provided is futile and a shamP2 In Local 118 v. Utility
Workers Union, 3 the court, in holding that the union member need
not exhaust the internal union appeal procedure, stated:
that where the method of appeal is arbitrary, frivolous, futile or
vain and not in accord with the sound principles of justice, the
member need not resort to that appeal. 94
2. No exhaustion is required where the original action against
the local violated due process. 5
3. Where the defendant international answers the complaint on
the merits, it has been held to have waived the defense of the failure
to exhaust the internal union remedies.9"
4. The courts have not been troubled in granting injunctive
relief even though there exists a little Norris-LaGuardia act within
the state. Where the act has been raised as a defense in an action
to enjoin the international from imposing a trusteeship it has been
rejected.9 7
In total, it appears clear that prior to the passage of title III of
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the
courts had evolved genuine protections against illegal and oppressive
trusteeships which, by a case by case utilization of the equitable powers
of the court, had rendered not insubstantial protection to the wronged
local and its members, while protecting the legitimate interests of the
international as the creator of the local and the unifying force in the
employer-employee relationship in the particular industry.
92 Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1931).
93 Supra note 91.
94 Id. at 531.
95 Fanara v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, supra note 9.
98 Masters, Mates & Pilots, Local 2 v. Int'l Masters, Mates & Pilots, 11 Pa. D.
& C.2d 75 and 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 86 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
97 Laundry Workers, Local 3008 v. Laundry Workers Int'l, 4 Wis. 2d 542, 91
N.W.2d 320 (1958). See also, Olson, Sp. Trustee, Local 113 v. Miller, 43 L.R.R.M.
2554 (D.C. Cir. 1959), where the court rejected the defense of the primary jurisdiction
of the NLRB.
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3. Title III of the Landrum-Griffin Act
Title III of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 represents the first attempt to legislate in the area of
union trusteeships.
The act provides four major provisions for the regulation of union
trusteeships. Section 301(a) requires every labor organization which
has or assumes a trusteeship to report that fact to the Secretary of
Labor within 30 days after imposition of the trusteeship and semi-
annually thereafter. Willful violation of section 301 (a) is declared a
crime in section 201(c). The trusteeship report must be signed by
the same officers who sign reports under title II and also by the
trustees of the subordinate body. The report must include: (1) the
date that the trusteeship was established, (2) a detailed statement of
purpose for establishing or continuing the trusteeship, and (3) the
nature and extent of participation by members of trustee organization
in the election of delegates to conventions and in election of national
officers. Furthermore, the national union must file the financial report
for the trusteed local required under section 201(b).
Section 302 provides the purposes for which a trusteeship may
be established and the requisite procedure. The specified permitted
purposes are: (1) correcting corruption or financial malpractice, (2)
assuring the performance of collective bargaining agreements or other
duties of a bargaining representative, (3) restoring democratic pro-
cedures, and (4) otherwise carrying out the legitimate objects of such
labor organization.
Section 303 expressly prohibits, while a union is under trustee-
ship, (1) the counting of votes of such local in any convention or
election of officers of the national union unless the delegates were
chosen by secret ballot in an election where all local members in good
standing were eligible to vote, or (2) the national union from taking
any funds from the trusteed local except the normal per capita tax
and assessments payable by other locals not under trusteeship.
Section 304 provides for civil enforcement of sections 302 and
303. Two methods are provided:
1. Upon written complaint by any member or subordinate body
of a labor organization to the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary shall
investigate and if he finds "probable cause to believe that such viola-
tion has occurred and has not been remedied" he shall bring a civil
action in any federal court having jurisdiction over the labor organiza-
tion.
2. Any member or subordinate organization can bring action in
a federal court having jurisdiction over the labor organization for such
relief as may be appropriate.
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Section 304 also provides for a presumption of validity for a
period of 18 months of any trusteeship established in conformity with
the labor organization's constitution and which was authorized or
ratified after a fair hearing by the executive board and/or other body
provided in the constitution. Any trusteeship of a duration longer
than 18 months is presumed to be invalid.
The legislative history indicates the thrust of these new statutory
provisions of federal labor law. Senator Goldwater noted that the act
is not confined to a trusteeship imposed by an international but
encompasses "every trusteeship imposed by one union over a sub-
ordinate body."
Section 304(c) providing the 18 month presumptions was the
result of an attempt to avoid setting restrictions making impossible the
establishment of a trusteeship. Senator Dodd proposed an amend-
ment requiring a national union to apply to the Secretary of Labor
for a 30-day order granting permission to establish the trusteeship.
During the 30-day period the Secretary of Labor would hold a hearing
and if the national union showed the need for the trusteeship by
"clear and convincing proof," the Secretary of Labor could order the
trusteeship continued for a period no longer than one year. The
amendment was rejected 8
The provision granting power to the Secretary of Labor to make
investigations and institute civil action is a rejection of Senator Ken-
nedy's proposal which would have placed enforcement in the hands
of the Labor Board.
A comparison of the provisions of title III with the pre-existing
case law, examined above, reveals:
1. Section 301 requiring initial and semi-annual reports to the
Secretary of Labor is, of course, a new and novel provision. At one
stroke it greatly increases the paper work to be done by the union
and floods the Department of Labor with heaps of additional informa-
tion about the administration of unions.
2. Section 302 dealing with the legitimate purposes of a trustee-
ship is essentially a codification of the controlling case law discussed
above. It probably does not operate to change the existing law.
Section 302 also incorporates the case law rule in stating that the
trusteeship must be established and administered in accordance with
the union constitution and bylaws.
3. Section 303 provides two express prohibitions which have not
been articulated in the case law. The prohibition against voting dele-
gates of the trusteed local to the international convention, unless
98 105 Cong. Rec. 5984-85 (daily ed. April 24, 1959).
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elected by secret ballot by all local members in good standing, is a
recognition that the trusteed local can be used as an instrument by
the international leadership to guarantee continuation in office.
4. Section 304, on its face apparently widens the pre-existing
remedies against oppressive or illegal trusteeships by providing that
the Secretary of Labor shall investigate any reported violation of the
law, and if he finds probable cause, shall bring action in the federal
court; and by opening the federal court to an action against a trustee-
ship by either the individual member or the local. As subsequently
shown, this provision has given way to conflicting opinions by federal
district courts and, in total, may actually diminish the rights pos-
sessed by the individual members and the local prior to the act.
Section 304 introduces a novel element in providing an 18 month
presumption of validity. It appears obvious that the intent was to
strike down those trusteeships that have been continuing for many
years. In the process the act does seem in variance with the attitude
of several of the state courts, quoted above, that look with extreme
caution upon all trusteeships. In any event, it should be noted that
the presumption only operates if the trusteeship was established in
accordance with the union's constitution and authorized or ratified by
a fair hearing. There is no requirement that the fair hearing be held
prior to imposition of the trusteeship.
4. Post Landrum-Griffin Act Case Law
The limited case law under title III of the act has already in-
dicated several difficult and confusing procedural problems arising
from the provisions of the act.
a. Area of Dispute
The area of greatest dispute involves the enforcement provisions
of section 304 and whether the provision for investigation by the Secre-
tary of Labor and institution of action by him must be exhausted
before the individual member or union body can bring action in the
federal court.
In Rizzo v. Ammond, 9 action was brought by the members of
Local 1262 of the retail clerks alleging wrongful imposition of trustee-
ship over their local by the international. The complaint alleged that
the hearing was a sham-no notice was given, and local officers were not
permitted to be present, personally or by their attorney. The court
dismissed the action on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The court
99 182 F. Supp. 456 (D.C. N.J. 1960). Accord, Flaherty v. McDonald, 40 Lab.
Cas. if 66,514 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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specifically held that there was no jurisdiction under the Landrum-
Griffin Act since it was a prerequisite that the individual member
exhaust the remedy provided through and by the Secretary of Labor
before he could bring action in the federal court under Section 304.
In contrast, is the opinion in Local 28, IBEW v. IBEW.1°' Here
action was brought to terminate the trusteeship over Local 28. Various
misappropriations of local's funds, violation of bylaws, and other
various wrongs were alleged against defendant Goidel, IBEW's inter-
national representative. The complaint specifically alleged violation of
the trusteeship provisions of title III, section 302 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act. After finding jurisdiction under
the act, irrespective of diversity or jurisdictional amount, the court
flatly rejected the decisions in Rizzo and Flaherty, and held that the
union member did not have to go first to the Secretary of Labor before
bringing action in the federal district court.
As a practical matter the impact of the Rizzo and Flaherty
decisions may be to actually reduce the rights of the individual mem-
bers and trusteed local. This is true as far as their rights in the federal
district court are concerned. It is yet to be decided whether the holding
of these cases will be applied to actions commenced in the state court.
b. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
The opinion of the court in the Local 28, IBEW case, 10 1 makes it
clear that the 1959 act itself establishes the jurisdiction of the court
over union trusteeships, as a federal question arising under federal law,
irrespective of any requirement of diversity or jurisdictional amount.
The decision in Flaherty v. McDonald'02 is not at variance on this
point since there the court indicated that jurisdiction under the federal
act failed only because of a failure to exhaust the administrative
remedy provided by the act, viz; investigation by the Secretary of
Labor. Though less clear, Rizzo v. Ammond °' s appears to proceed on
this basis also.
c. Jurisdiction over the Person
Both the Flaherty and Rizzo cases represent excellent illustra-
tions of the insurmountable procedural difficulties of federal court
jurisdiction over union trusteeships in the absence of statutory juris-
diction. These difficulties include the requirement of divers-
ity'04 (perhaps avoidable through the device of a class action);
100 4o Lab. Cas. ff 66,578 (D.C. Md. 1960).
101 Supra note 100.
102 Supra note 99.
103 Ibid.
104 See Underwood v. McBride, 45 L.R.R.M. 3154 (D.C. Del. 1960).
[Vol. 22
CONTROL OF A LABOR UNION
the requirement of the jurisdictional amount (held not satisfied
in Rizzo); personal jurisdiction over individual defendants, non-
residents of the state in which the federal court sits and not
personally served within that state; and necessity of service upon a
representative of the international within the state in his represent-
ative capacity.
In addition, a common problem in both the state and federal
court proceedings on union trusteeships under the act or common law,
exists in that the international is often multi-state in operation and
activities, and the local may also possess this characteristic. This
fact gives rise to the problem of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of
the state or federal district courts. As a result, the policy of a
uniform application of an order is defeated by the necessary confines
of the order to the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The issue is
touched upon by the court in the Rizzo case where the court held
that it could not through a receiver assume possession of its assets
and property located beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or to direct
the international's activities beyond the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This holding may well lead to the situation where different federal
courts reach contrary conclusions as to a trusteeship over a particular
local. It is even more likely to result in differing conclusions as to
trusteeships or disaffiliations of locals in the same international arising
from the same circumstances.
d. The Problem of Federal Pre-emption
Finally, there is still the problem of federal pre-emption arising
from the passage of title III of the Landrum-Griffin Act. Section
603 (a) of the act appears to provide for no federal pre-emption. It
states:
(a) Except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this
Act shall reduce or limit the responsibilities of any labor organiza-
tion or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a
labor organization, or of any trust in which a labor organization is
interested, under any other Federal law or under the laws of any
State, and, except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing
in this Act shall take away any right or bar any remedy to which
members of a labor organization are entitled under such other
Federal law or law of any State.105
It should be noted that the provision speaks of the "law of any
state" and it may be argued that it does not keep intact the common
law and equity powers heretofore exercised by the state court. In any
event in the only reported case on the issue to date,"' the court denied
105 73 Stat. 540 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 523 (Supp. I, 1959).
106 Kuka v. Hoffman, 45 L.R.RM. 2284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
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the motion for an injunction pendente lite to restrain the Upholsterers
International Union from appointing or attempting to appoint a
trustee over Local 601 on the grounds, inter alia, that the dispute as to
whether the court was without jurisdiction because of title III of the
act of 1959 could not be decided on motion papers.
The operation of title III as revealed by the report of the Bureau
of Labor-Management Reports for the nine month period ending at
the fiscal year June 30, 1960, reveals that the act has had virtually
no effect whatsoever in eliminating the charged abuses in trusteeships
which were in large measure responsible for the passage of title III.
The total number of alleged violations under sections 301, 302,
and 303 is 76.107 This includes violations relating to the adequacy of
the reports required under section 301. No legal action has been
commenced by the Secretary of Labor to declare a trusteeship un-
lawful. 08 Of the 76 investigations, 36 were closed and 43 were still
pending as of June 30, 1960. "Many" of the 76 complaints filed with
the Bureau concerned trusteeships of the Teamsters International."°9
Although "a thorough investigation of the financial records of the
Teamsters' locals under trusteeship as well as the records of the
international""" was made, no action has been commenced by the
Secretary of Labor, indicating either the legality revealed by such
financial records or the reluctance and inability of the Secretary of
Labor to act.
Although the reports filed with the Bureau revealed that of the
592 reporting trusteeships, 50% were at least eighteen months old and
20% were more than ten years old,"' no action has been taken by
the Secretary of Labor against such entrenched trusteeships which,
under the law, are presumed to be unlawful. There have been no
reports of voluntary termination of the long-term trusteeships which
were so effectively used by proponents of title III to obtain its passage
in Congress.
G. CONTROL BY THE COURTs-THE MONITORSHIP SYSTEM
The final and most drastic form of control over the international,
the local and the members is the court monitorship. This is the
system that has existed within the Teamsters International since 1957.
Examination of the monitorship system over the Teamsters Inter-
national reveals the extreme nature of this arrangement and the
107 Supra note 58, Table 9, p. 65.
108 Id. at 61.
109 Id. at 33.
110 Id. at 34.
111 Id. at 32.
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extreme impact upon the relationship and power exercised in the
international, the local and the membership.
The Teamster monitorship arose out of a compromise settlement
of the legal challenge to the 17th National Convention and national
election of the Teamsters scheduled for September, 1957. The back-
ground for the legal challenge to the leadership of the Teamsters
International had been provided through the highly publicized expos6
of the McClellan Committee which, in large measure, had concentrated
upon the Teamsters' then General President David Beck and his
successor James Hoffa.112
Thirteen New York area rank and file members of the Teamsters
commenced an action employing an attorney well known for repre-
senting employers in labor relations matters.113 The action commenced
by these rank and file members, relying upon the revelations before the
Senate McClellan Committee, alleged violations of the union constitu-
tion and rigging of the September convention, and prayed for an
injunction against the convention and for the appointment of a re-
ceiver or master to supervise the intralocal balloting and the con-
vention. A preliminary injunction was issued by the district court a
day before the scheduled convention, 114 but was vacated by the court
of appeals. The convention was held and James Hoffa and his slate
were elected. The plaintiffs amended their complaint and attacked
the convention proceedings at which the defendants, Hoffa and most
of his slate, had been elected. The new order of the district court,
as modified by the court of appeals, restrained the Hoffa slate from
taking office and restrained the effectiveness of certain constitutional
amendments which had been passed at the convention.
After these preliminary proceedings, a twenty-two day trial
commenced in late November, 1957. After the plaintiff's case was in
and prior to the defendant union's presentation, a settlement
was agreed upon by the parties. This was subsequently agreed
to by the court and incorporated into a consent decree. The major
provisions of this decree, overriding the established structure and
procedure of the union and any contrary provisions in the union
constitution and bylaws, included provisions that:
a. The Hoffa slate would take office "provisionally."
b. A Board of Monitors would be established consisting of a
112 "Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field," 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957).
113 The attorney, Godfrey P. Schmidt, is a New York lawyer, primarily representing
employers in the labor relations field.
114 District Court judge F. Dickinson Letts issued the preliminary injunction on
September 28, 1957. The convention was scheduled for September 29, 1957.
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union designated monitor, a plaintiffs' designated monitor and an
"impartial" monitor to be jointly chosen.
c. A series of reforms would be undertaken by the general
executive board in cooperation with the Board of Monitors encom-
passing financial and accounting procedures, elimination of conflict
of interests, elimination of unjustifiable trusteeships, and protection
of democratic rights.
d. A new election of officers shall take place at any time after
one year from the effective date of the consent decree.
e. Compensation for the Board of Monitors as determined by
the court shall be paid by the Teamsters International.
f. The Teamsters International shall pay the counsel fees and
expenses of the plaintiffs, subject to approval of the court.
A naked proposal to give the Board of Monitors broad authority
to supervise the union and compel compliance with its recommenda-
tions was not inserted into the decree."'
The original impartial chairman of the Board of Monitors, Judge
Nathan Clayton, resigned after six months. Interestingly, his letter of
resignation indicates a series of investigations or studies undertaken
by the Board of Monitors with the only definitive aspects being the
reduction of trusteeships from 107 to 61 and the conclusion that the
reports of the IBT officers indicated no current conflict of interest.
However, the separate report of the plaintiffs' Monitor Schmidt, urged
additional "monitor initiative" to eliminate abuses. The union monitor
Wells called for the Board of Monitor's scrupulous observance of the
international constitution and that it refrain from usurping power not
given to it under the consent decree.
With the appointment of Martin F. O'Donoghue as the new
impartial chairman, the until then smooth operation of the Board of
Monitors was drastically changed. Within a month, the monitors
had established their own staff including an investigator and an exec-
utive assistant. The Board of Monitors began issuing "orders of rec-
ommendation" which ran the whole gamut of the operation of the
Teamsters International from financial records to alleged election
violations.
The plaintiffs' monitor and Mr. O'Donoghue, fearing that these
orders of recommendation were not being carried out by the union,
moved in court to have the monitors granted certain mandatory powers
over the Teamsters' general executive board and to postpone the new
115 The initial report of the Board of Monitors indicates that the union rejected a
proposal which would have given the Board of Monitors broad supervisory power over
the entire operation of the union. Initial Report of the Board of Monitors, CA #2361
-1957.
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election which had been called by the Teamsters' executive board.
The broad decision issued by District Judge Letts found that the
monitors had mandatory powers and could, in fact, pursue a policy of
a general cleaning-up of the union." 6 The court further changed the
consent decree by deleting the provisions that the Teamsters could call
a new election after the expiration of one year. Instead, the court
inserted a provision giving the Board of Monitors the sole power to
recommend a new election.
Upon appeal to the court of appeals, the Board of Monitors,
rather than rely upon the concept of mandatory powers, rested their
claim upon the obligation of the union to obey the spirit of the consent
decree and the power of the district court to issue orders to compel
the union to comply with the recommendations of the monitors in
specific matters. The decision of the court of appeals" 7 sets down a
significant framework for the operation of the Board of Monitors.
By its opinions: (a) the consent decree was upheld; (b) the court
declined to pass upon whether the union was acting in "bad faith,"
as had been found by Judge Letts; (c) the Board of Monitors was
strictly limited to consultative and recommending functions. The
latter function of the Board of Monitors could take place without
hearing the defendants; and (d) the court affirmed Judge Letts'
postponement of the proposed Teamster International election. But
the power to recommend such a new convention was placed in the
district court rather than with the Board of Monitors.
Since the court of appeals decision, the Board of Monitors has
continued in its attempt to exercise increasing power and authority
over the Teamsters International. In the summer of 1959, the mon-
itors attempted to exercise subpoena powers to look at certain books
of a midwest local of the Teamsters. The court of appeals decision,
above referred to, approved the district court's order for an audit of
these books. The Board of Monitors has also attempted to conduct
independent hearings. The right to conduct such hearings has been
vigorously opposed by the union.
One important result of the court of appeals decision is that sub-
sequently, to a large extent, the court has been functioning as a
supervisor of the consent decree together with the district court.
In fact at several stages of this litigation, affidavits have been
directly submitted to the court of appeals which had not appeared in
the proceedings below. The union's attempt to obtain a stay and for
a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was unsuc-
cessful. But it did result in a memorandum by Mr. Justice Frank-
116 Memorandum Opinion, CA #2361-1957 (December 11, 1958).
117 269 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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furter,"n which together with the consent decree and the opinion of
the court of appeals, forms the triumvirate of written documents under
which the Board of Monitors presently operates.
The next battle scene was staged over the employment by the
Board of Monitors of an independent law firm. This law firm not
only was employed for the purpose of defending the various actions
commenced by the union to restrain the Board, but also to read,
evaluate and report on the approximately 20,000 pages of testimony
taken before the McClellan committee. Presumably, this was ordered
in order to prepare certain recommendations to be made by the Board
of Monitors. The court of appeals vacated the district court's order
permitting the employment of such a law firm and held "that the board
of monitors may engage the services of said firm of lawyers to assist
them in litigation prudently and reasonably deemed by the board to
be required in performance of the duties of the board." The appellate
court also denied the Board of Monitors' chairman any exclusive
authority with regard to supervision of the law firm.
The next attack by the Board of Monitors upon the Teamsters
International leadership was the most extreme and direct. In a
report issued in September 1959, known as the Sun Valley Interim
Report, the Board of Monitors accused the union president, Hoffa, of
breach of his fiduciary obligation and of investing union funds for his
own purposes. The monitors asked the district court to remove Hoffa
as general president of the union if the court agreed with its report.119
In this dispute a collateral matter came to the forefront in the dis-
qualification of Judge Letts, the district court judge, to hear the
Board of Monitors' motion. Judge Letts disqualified himself on the
basis of an affidavit filed by Mr. Hoffa in which it was stated that the
Judge had announced to the press that he intended to remove Hoffa
because of the latter's efforts to place a certain individual on the Board
of Monitors. 90
Preliminarily, Hoffa attempted to enjoin the hearings before
the federal district court on the monitors' motion to remove him
as the president of the Teamsters Union. The district judge de-
nied the motion and in June, 1960, the court of appeals held that
the denial was not an appealable order. However, the court of appeals
did restore to the district court docket two requests for mandamus and
prohibition to restrain the district court judge from proceeding to trial
on the Sun Valley issue.
118 English v. Cunningham, 361 U.S. 905, (1959).
119 In defense, Mr. Hoffa stated that the transaction was legitimate union business,
that the funds were not held as collateral and, in any event, the consent decree did not
grant the district court the power to remove any of the elected officials who had not
formally taken office because of the decree.
120 The individual in question was William Bufalino.
[Vol. 22
CONTROL OF A LABOR UNION
Other matters in the continuing and unrestrained conflict between
the Teamsters Union leadership and the Board of Monitors show the
extent of this conflict and the effect upon the relationship of the inter-
national with its locals and members arising from this Board of Mon-
itorship system. Thus the Teamsters International has been unsuc-
cessful in preventing the Board of Monitors from "making its case"
by issuance of general press releases on matters which were not of
public record. Orders by District Judge Letts permitting the Board of
Monitors to hire additional attorneys for its staff and to have the
chairman direct the monitors' staff and direct the law firm were both
subsequently reversed by the court of appeals.
The battle between the union leadership and Mr. O'Donoghue,
chairman of the Board of Monitors, was intensified when President
Hoffa made a motion in the district court to have Chairman O'Don-
oghue removed from his position because of a question of conflict of
interest under Canon 37 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The
conflict of interest arose from the fact that Mr. O'Donoghue had
previously represented the Teamsters Union and Mr. Hoffa in prior
and earlier stages of the related litigation arising out of the monitor-
ship. The information which Mr. O'Donoghue obtained while repre-
senting his client, it was argued, would clearly result in a conflict of
interest situation now that, under the leadership of Mr. O'Donoghue,
the Board of Monitors had moved in court to have Mr. Hoffa removed
as president of the union.
The situation became more complex, more expensive, and in
certain aspects slightly ridiculous, when within the past year a full
grown intramonitor conflict has arisen. This conflict came into the
open when the chairman, Mr. O'Donoghue, unsuccessfully attempted
to have the plaintiffs' monitor, Lawrence T. Smith, 2 1 second the report
dealing with the alleged violations of the consent order by Mr. Hoffa.
Monitor Smith refused to second the report. The dispute hit a high-
point when District Judge Letts removed Mr. Smith as a monitor on
March 30, 1960, accusing Mr. Smith of not having his "heart in the
assignment." Almost simultaneously, the course that Godfrey Schmidt
had been following became entangled with this dispute. The resigna-
tion of Mr. Schmidt as the attorney for the plaintiffs was accepted
by 8 of the 12 plaintiffs. Mr. Schmidt had lined up with Chairman
O'Donoghue in the dispute against Monitor Smith. The plaintiffs,
who accepted Godfrey Schmidt's resignation, immediately hired
another New York attorney and supported Mr. Smith. But Judge
Letts, who quite clearly sided with Chairman O'Donoghue, refused to
permit the substitution. His order was vacated by the court of appeals
in May, 1960.
121 Mr. Smith had replaced Godfrey P. Schmidt as the plaintiffs' monitor.
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Those plaintiffs who supported Mr. Schmidt nominated the
former FBI agent, Terrence McShane, as the successor to Mr. Smith
on the Board. Judge Letts immediately appointed McShane, again
indicating his full support for the O'Donoghue-Schmidt faction among
the monitors and the plaintiffs. But again the court of appeals dis-
agreed vigorously with the action taken by District Judge Letts. They
first stayed the order removing Smith as a monitor, and subsequently
set aside the order removing him on the grounds that the consent
decree had been violated in that the removal had taken place without
notice, hearing and appeal, which are required under paragraph 2
of the consent decree. Finally, it might be noted that the monitor
representing the union leadership was changed from Monitor Maher
to Mr. William Bufalino.
This continual battle on each and every aspect of the relation-
ship between the Board of Monitors and the Teamsters International
and on each and every aspect of any legal question arising therefrom
clearly indicates the extent to which there is a basic and irreconcilable
inability for the Board of Monitors and the union leadership to oper-
ate together.
The history of the Board of Monitors' control over the Teamsters
International shows a pattern of an increasingly aggravating conflict
and schism between the Board of Monitors and the Teamsters Inter-
national leadership. The impact of this upon the membership of the
Teamsters is clear. There are no fundamental reforms that have been
accomplished. The plaintiffs, who constitute a small, in fact infini-
tismal number of members of the Teamsters Union, have themselves
on numerous occasions been split as to who should represent them
and who should be their monitor on the Board of Monitors.
More fundamental is that the entire concept of monitorship over
a huge and powerful trade union like the Teamsters International is
doomed to failure if one is to speak in terms of accomplishing worthy
objectives. The New York Times of January 2, 1961, in discussing
the anticipated ending of the Monitorship, reports as follows:
The Board of Monitors was soon bogged down with Teamsters, law
suits, intra-mural disputes and personnel turn-over .... Court action
has been hot and heavy. More than 100 motions have been heard
by Judge Letts, 40 appeals have been taken to the Court of Appeals
and 3 appeals have reached the Supreme Court. Teamster officials
estimate that legal expenses and the $25 an hour monitor's fee,
and their expenses, have cost the union treasury more than $1,500,
000. The dispute has evolved to the point where 5 factions are
concerned. They are Mr. Hoffa and the Teamsters Union, eight of
the original 13 Teamster insurgents; four other insurgents; a lone
insurgent; and a latecomer group of intervenors, representing locals
with 50,000 members. . . . If Judge Letts is eventually satisfied
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with Teamster union reforms and orders a new convention, it will
mean that the question of Mr. Hoffa's eligibility for union office
will be left to the membership.
Note well the last line of the article. "The question of Mr. Hoffa's
eligibility for union office will be left to the membership." That's
where it belonged in the first place.'2 2
CONCLUSION
The problem of perfecting an equitable and just balance of
controls between an international union, its locals and the mem-
bers of the union will never be solved by the anarchic and archaic
methods by which labor union problems have been approached in the
last several decades.
The anarchy that exists in this field is part and parcel of the
ill-conceived and ill-organized methods of dealing with all labor prob-
lems. At best, there are patchwork attempts to remedy existing evils
and little, if any, heed is paid by legislators and officials, both from
within and without the trade union movement, to the basic ills which
plague our economic life.
The many controls resulting from federal legislation, state legis-
lation, federal court decisions, state court decisions, federal admin-
istrative agency rulings and state administrative agency. rulings have
not solved the problem of curbing evil people, whether they be
racketeers in industry or labor. Nor have they solved the problem
of providing quick and simple justice either to the worker or to the
employer, or adequately safeguarded the pension and welfare funds,
upon which workers depend for their future. Nor have they provided
a workable system of democratic controls of trade union rights. A
method has not yet been found of meeting national emergency strikes.
These controls have not protected employers and workers against
cutthroat competition on the part of the states which have restrictive
right-to-work laws. Nor do they adequately meet the problem of
protecting governmental employees and hospital employees from the
abuses inherent in denying them the right to strike without giving
them a proper substitute forum in which to obtain a redress of griev-
ances that would place them on a parity with other workers.
What is required is not more legislation, but rather an intensive,
objective federal study of our existing labor laws, with the end in view
of replacing present anarchy with an integrated system of labor law
that will bring order out of chaos.
122 As this article goes to press, rulings by Judge Letts granted the Teamsters
Union's motion, directed a convention and election, ordered the monitorship dissolved,
and denied counsel fees for the attorneys from the union treasury. New York Times,
March 1, 1961.
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